Distributive and contextual equity in landholder participation in biodiversity offsets: a case study of biodiversity offsets in New South Wales, Australia by Ruoso, L-E & Plant, R
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tbsm22
Ecosystems and People
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tbsm22
Distributive and contextual equity in landholder
participation in biodiversity offsets: a case study of
biodiversity offsets in New South Wales, Australia
Laure-Elise Ruoso & Roel Plant
To cite this article: Laure-Elise Ruoso & Roel Plant (2021) Distributive and contextual equity in
landholder participation in biodiversity offsets: a case study of biodiversity offsets in New South
Wales, Australia, Ecosystems and People, 17:1, 6-24, DOI: 10.1080/26395916.2020.1862914
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/26395916.2020.1862914
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 27 Jan 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 1395
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
RESEARCH
Distributive and contextual equity in landholder participation in biodiversity 
offsets: a case study of biodiversity offsets in New South Wales, Australia
Laure-Elise Ruoso and Roel Plant
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia  
ABSTRACT
While the challenges represented by biodiversity offsets in terms of biodiversity outcomes 
have been scrutinised in the scientific literature, less attention has been paid to the equity 
challenges they represent, particularly with regard to landholders’ individual ability to parti-
cipate in biodiversity offsets. We address this knowledge gap by providing insights into the 
factors that enable some landholders and prevent others to participate in the biodiversity 
offset scheme operating in New South Wales (NSW, Australia). To do so, we build on the 
literature on Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), which addresses a range of equity 
challenges related to PES, albeit with a specific focus on developing countries. Our results 
show that experience, access to resources and information, support through formal and 
informal networks and land size explain why some landholders manage to participate in 
the biodiversity offset scheme in NSW, while others do not. In the discussion, we focus on 
identifying the support non-participating landholders would need in order to participate in 
the scheme and we provide recommendations to improve the equity in landholders’ access 
to biodiversity offsets in New South Wales. We also discuss the specificity of equity dimen-
sions in a developed country context.
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1. Introduction
Biodiversity offsets can be defined as: (1) the supply 
of an ecological gain, (2) in response to an ecological 
loss, (3) located in a compensation site distinct from 
the impacted site, (4) following agreed-upon criteria 
for the ecological equivalence between gains and 
losses (Vaissière et al. 2020). The idea of compensat-
ing for biodiversity loss first emerged at the 1972 
Ramsar Convention (Hrabanski 2015). The policy 
rationale for the development and implementation 
of biodiversity offsets is that offsets embed the 
accounting of biodiversity within development activ-
ities (Bull et al. 2013).
Offsetting was first implemented in the USA in the 
1970s and progressively spread to Australia and Europe 
in the 1990s and 2000s (Damiens et al. 2020). More 
recently, biodiversity offsets have also been adopted in 
Latin America, where Brazil and Mexico have the highest 
numbers of offset projects recorded, and to a lesser extent 
in Africa and Asia (Bull and Strange 2018). By 2016, 
nearly 100 compensation or offset mechanisms had 
been implemented in 33 countries (Bennett et al. 2017). 
To date, in Australia, biodiversity offsetting mechanisms 
have been implemented at the federal level as well as in 
several states, among which New South Wales (NSW).
Different methods exist to implement and man-
age biodiversity offsets (Froger et al. 2015). Offsets 
can be carried out in an ‘ad hoc’ manner, where 
ecological measures (restoration, rehabilitation or 
preservation) are implemented by the developer (or 
the service provider hired by the developer) in a site 
situated on or near the site developed. They can also 
take the form of financial transfers, where the devel-
oper pays a certain amount of money to environ-
mental entities. Finally, biodiversity offsets can take 
the form of offset banking, where a supply of biodi-
versity credits is generated according to a specific 
accounting system and related methodology. The 
required credits can then be bought by developers 
to offset their impacts. The aim of the banking 
system was to overcome issues regarding the ‘ad 
hoc’ implementation of offsets by developers them-
selves. While the case study that will be explored in 
this article (the biodiversity offset scheme in NSW) 
is a banking system, the framing of the research 
problem presented below applies to biodiversity off-
sets more generally.
The idea that ecological loss – especially loss of 
native vegetation – could be compensated by provid-
ing an ecological gain on another site has been widely 
criticised and challenged in the scientific literature 
(Maron et al. 2012, 2016) and environmental activists’ 
circles (Hrabanski 2015). Criticism of biodiversity 
offsetting often centres on its (lack of) ecological 
soundness, particularly whether offsets can indeed 
halt biodiversity losses. Both theoretical and practical 
challenges have been identified, such as choosing 
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appropriate metrics for measuring biodiversity, defin-
ing ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity and equivalence 
between losses and gains, tackling uncertainty regard-
ing biodiversity outcomes, and monitoring compli-
ance and outcomes among other things (Maron et al. 
2012; Bull et al. 2013). In addition, biodiversity offsets 
have been shown to have the potential to lead to 
perverse outcomes, such as entrenching baseline 
declines by calculating ‘no net loss’ based on 
a declining counterfactual scenario (Gordon et al. 
2015).
In order to align with the three pillars of sustain-
ability, it could also be expected that in addition to 
rules related to ecological outcomes, rules would be 
established regarding the expected social outcomes of 
biodiversity offsets. And while international best 
practice recognises that individuals should be ‘no 
worse off’ (and even preferably ‘better off’) after the 
implementation of a biodiversity offset project, no 
guidelines exist on how to achieve that goal 
(Griffiths et al. 2019a). Even if the social dimension 
seems to have been less of a focus in biodiversity 
offset policies, a strand of literature has emerged 
that considers the question of the social outcomes 
of biodiversity offsets as crucial, and asks what bio-
diversity offsets mean for society, taking a political, 
ethical or social entry point. Some scholars adopt 
a radical approach, considering that offsets are not 
a viable solution for biodiversity conservation and 
have negative social outcomes. Others adopt 
a reformist approach, calling for improvement of 
the social/equity outcomes of biodiversity offsets 
(Hrabanski 2015). Critical ‘radical’ scholars (e.g. 
Hillman and Instone 2010; Spash 2015; 
Apostolopoulou and Adams 2017) see biodiversity 
offsets as contributing to the further ‘commodifica-
tion of nature’ (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 
2011), further ignoring the cultural and place-based 
values of biodiversity. Such omissions lead to nega-
tive equity outcomes for society at large, as 
a proportion of the population might lose access to 
natural areas it values. In contrast, a critical ‘refor-
mist’ approach advocates for better accounting of the 
social and equity outcomes of offsets (BenDor et al. 
2008; Bidaud et al. 2017; Griffiths et al. 2019a, 2019b).
Both the ‘radical’ and ‘reformist’ schools focus on 
the equity outcomes of biodiversity offsets for society 
at large, overlooking other equity challenges, such as 
those related to individual landholders’ access or 
ability to participate in biodiversity offsets. In con-
trast, the literature on Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES)1 discusses a wider range of equity 
challenges (Porras 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010; 
García-Amado et al. 2011; Krause and Loft 2013; 
Mahanty et al. 2013; McDermott et al. 2013; Pascual 
et al. 2014; Calvet-Mir et al. 2015; Haas et al. 2019). 
While biodiversity offsets and PES have rather differ-
ent premises – biodiversity offsets aim at mitigating 
the impact of biodiversity loss by offsetting impacts 
in one place through biodiversity gains in another 
place, whereas PES provide financial incentives to 
landholders to change their land-use practices in 
order to derive positive environmental outcomes 
based on a baseline scenario – Vaissière et al. (2020) 
argue that lessons learnt from PES could be used to 
improve biodiversity offsets, particularly regarding 
equity. Adopting this viewpoint, we build on the 
PES literature to develop our position regarding 
equity challenges related to biodiversity offsets.
In this paper, we look into the equity challenges 
faced by the biodiversity offset scheme implemented 
in NSW, Australia, with particular focus on access to 
the scheme on the supplier’s side (i.e. supplier of 
ecological gain). Prior to the commencement of our 
study, stakeholders involved in the management of 
the biodiversity offset scheme in NSW had observed 
that participation of individual landholders (e.g. 
farmers and rural-residential landholders) was poor 
in comparison to entrepreneurial, religious and pub-
lic landholders. We, therefore, ask: what are the 
enablers to entrepreneurial, religious and public land-
holders’ participation and the barriers to individual 
landholders’ participation? Our goal is to develop 
insights into how barriers to individual landholder 
participation might be lowered or removed alto-
gether. As mentioned above, equity dimensions of 
biodiversity offsets beyond societal equity outcomes 
have been understudied. We address this research gap 
by providing empirical evidence on factors explaining 
inequity in landholders’ access to biodiversity offsets. 
In addition, most of the biodiversity offsets and PES 
research focusing on equity has been carried out in 
developing country contexts. We make a further con-
tribution to knowledge by providing insights into 
equity in access to biodiversity offset schemes in 
a developed country context.
2. Context and equity framework
2.1. The NSW context
To date, NSW has known two offsetting schemes. 
Established in 2006, the main objective of the first 
scheme, the Biodiversity Banking and Offsets Scheme 
(BioBanking), was to develop a systematic process to 
determine offsets, avoiding previous ‘ad hoc’ offset-
ting practices. Indeed, before Biobanking was estab-
lished, developers were required to prepare a Species 
Impact Statement as part of the development applica-
tion process. If the authority in charge of the devel-
opment decision found it necessary to offset, the 
offset would then be negotiated between the 
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developer and the authority. This ‘ad hoc’ process 
meant that there was no consistent rule around the 
methodology used to assess biodiversity impacts and 
the measures necessary to restore habitats. 
BioBanking was therefore an attempt to make this 
process more systematic. However, it was not widely 
adopted by developers, as it was not compulsory and 
not applicable to all types of development, including 
major developments (Williams 2016; Dupont 2017).
In addition to BioBanking, several other offset 
schemes were developed in NSW under different 
legislation: (i) Property Vegetation Plans (2005) 
under the Native Vegetation Act 20032; (ii) 
Biodiversity Certification (2010) under the 
Threatened Species Conservation Act 19953; (iii) 
Biodiversity Offsets Policy for Major Projects (2014) 
under the Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Act 1979.4 As a result, many different processes 
existed for offsets, all using different methodologies. 
A review of the legislation in 2014 led to the estab-
lishment of the Biodiversity Conservation Act in 
2016, which consolidated those many different pro-
cesses by providing what is considered as a ‘transpar-
ent and peer-reviewed method for biodiversity 
assessment’ (Byron et al. 2014, p. 7). In the 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, the use of biodi-
versity offsets – now called NSW Biodiversity Offsets 
Scheme (BOS) – became the only pathway for most 
developments, with their impacts assessed according 
to one consistent methodology, the Biodiversity 
Assessment Method.
The governance of the scheme is complex and has 
undergone modifications with the change in legisla-
tion. Under BioBanking, the main players were i) 
developers, ii) landholders, iii) consultants, iv) the 
Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) – renamed 
Environment Energy and Science (EES) in 2019, v) the 
Greater Sydney Local Land Services (GSLLS), as well 
as v) brokers. Their roles were as follows: 
(i) Developers needing to buy offsets could either 
set up offset themselves or buy credits to 
landholders.
(ii) Landholders wanting to generate and sell cred-
its needed to confirm their eligibility, submit 
an expression of interest, get their land 
assessed using the Biodiversity Banking 
Assessment Methodology, enter into an agree-
ment with the OEH, sell their credits to 
a developer, and start receiving annual pay-
ments for management actions.
(iii) Consultants worked with developers and land-
holders to identify the number of credits they 
would need to purchase (developers) or they 
would generate (landholders) by using the 
Biodiversity Banking Assessment Method.
(iv) OEH managed and administered the fund, by 
notably entering into contracts with land-
holders, managing the public register where 
developers and landholders could advertise 
the credits they needed to purchase (develo-
pers) or would like to sell (landholders), as 
well as the credit calculator, which provided 
information on the price of credits based on 
previous sales.
(v) GSLLS, a government agency providing land 
management advice to landholders, played an 
informal role in BioBanking by talking about 
the scheme to the landholders they interact 
with and providing information to the agency 
managing the scheme about landholders’ per-
spectives on the scheme.
(vi) Finally, brokers, who usually seemed to play 
that role in a relatively informal fashion, 
served as intermediaries between developers 
wanting to purchase credits and landholders 
wanting to sell theirs.
With the new legislation, the scheme and its govern-
ance have changed, the main changes being a name 
change from BioBanking to Biodiversity Offset 
Scheme (BOS), the introduction of a new key player, 
the Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) and 
a changed role for OEH (now EES). Under 
BioBanking, OEH managed and administered the 
scheme; under the BOS, the BCT manages the 
scheme, while EES oversees its administration. 
BCT’s role is to (i) enter into agreements with land-
holders, (ii) source offsets for developers who can 
now pay the BCT to find offsets for them and (iii) 
pay landholders for their management actions 
through the Biodiversity Stewardship Payment 
Fund. The current role of EES is to manage the public 
register and the credit calculator.
In this paper, our primary focus is on the offset 
supply side (i.e. the landholders). Five main cate-
gories of landholders have been identified: i) public 
institutions; ii) companies offsetting their own devel-
opments; iii) religious congregations; iv) entrepre-
neurial landholders and v) individual landholders 
(e.g. farmers, rural living landholders).5 Under 
BioBanking, the first four types of landholders repre-
sented the majority of participants, while individual 
landholders were underrepresented. After the 
reform, the NSW Biodiversity Offset Scheme became 
primarily attractive to public landholders (e.g. 
Councils). This seems to be in large part due to the 
changed assessment methodology, mentioned ear-
lier. Under the new methodology, the number of 
credits generated on a property has decreased. 
However, credit prices as estimated by EES’s credit 
price calculator are based on price trends under the 
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previous methodology. Consequently, many land-
holders did not deem participation in the scheme 
to be economically viable whilst participation rates 
of public landholders increased. The surge of public 
landholder participation can be explained as follows. 
The financial structure of the scheme has two parts: 
part A and part B. Part A represents the manage-
ment, that is, money the landholder will receive in 
perpetuity to improve the state of biodiversity on 
his/her land. Part B represents the profit, which is 
a one-off lump sum payment, in addition to Part A, 
reflecting the opportunity cost. As the number of 
credits generated per hectare diminished, in many 
cases, credit prices seemed to often only cover the 
Part A and no profit (Part B) was made. This ren-
dered the scheme primarily attractive for public 
landholders (e.g. Councils), as they mostly seek 
funding to cover management costs rather than 
make a profit.
Our case study research in NSW was conducted 
against a background of a changing legislative con-
text. This change mainly affected the profitability of 
the scheme – the number of credits generated per 
hectare dropped under the new scheme. As this chal-
lenge could be overcome by recalculating credit 
prices, and considering that our perspective goes 
beyond profitability as the only determinant of parti-
cipation, we did not make the one-off effects of 
legislative change our object of analysis. Instead, we 
address the many other factors (e.g. land size, access 
to information, knowledge and networks) that may 
directly or indirectly influence landholder access to 
the scheme. The methodology adopted for this 
research will be presented in Section 3.1.
As most of our interviewees engaged with 
BioBanking rather than the BOS6, and because the 
BOS is still colloquially referred to as ‘biobanking’, we 
will refer to biodiversity offsetting in NSW as ‘bio-
banking’ or ‘the biobanking scheme’ in the remainder 
of the text.
2.2 The equity framework
This section looks at how the literature on biodiver-
sity offsets and PES addresses equity. We will first 
define the dimensions of equity as identified in the 
literature and discuss how they can be used to analyse 
the design and implementation of a biodiversity offset 
scheme. Secondly, we will present the contextual fac-
tors that have been impacting the equity of PES.
As mentioned in the Introduction, equity has not 
yet been fully addressed by the biodiversity offset 
literature. Indeed, only a few publications tackle this 
question (BenDor et al. 2008; Bidaud et al. 2017; 
Griffiths et al. 2019a, 2019b). Moreover, these studies 
mostly focus on the distribution of outcomes from 
biodiversity offsets – that is, who gets the benefits and 
who bears the burden of the implementation of bio-
diversity offsets. In contrast to biodiversity offsets, 
PES practitioners and researchers have been obser-
ving and evaluating the diverse equity dimensions of 
PES (Porras 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010; 
McDermott et al. 2013; Narloch et al. 2013; 
Hejnowicz et al. 2014; Pascual et al. 2014).
Three equity dimensions have been identified and 
conceptualised in the PES literature (McDermott 
et al. 2013; Pascual et al. 2014; Friedman et al. 
2018). These have a role to play in the design of 
a scheme, its implementation, its management and 
evaluation of its outcomes: 
(i) Procedural equity - the inclusion of all stake-
holders in the political process leading to the 
allocation of resources. For biodiversity offset-
ting or PES, this would be about how stake-
holders are being involved in the design of the 
scheme and consulted on an ongoing basis 
regarding its implementation and management.
(ii) Recognitional equity - how the scheme accounts 
for the diverse knowledge, values and norms of 
stakeholders. The focus would be on the degree 
to which different forms of knowledge and 
values are integrated into the design of the 
scheme, as well as its implementation and man-
agement, notably in terms of determining the 
objectives of the scheme and its rules.
(iii) Distributive equity - the allocation of costs 
and benefits from the scheme. For biodiver-
sity offsetting or PES, this could refer to 
implementation and management, specifically 
landholders’ ability to participate in the 
scheme, as well as its outcomes. Outcomes 
derive from the scheme’s impacts on its par-
ticipants as well as on the broader population. 
The focus could be on the distribution of the 
financial benefits as well as the human and 
social benefits of the scheme.
The literature identifies a fourth dimension of 
equity – contextual equity – as underpinning the 
three above dimensions. Contextual equity refers to 
the existing political, social, cultural and historical 
context in which biodiversity offsetting or PES are 
implemented. It examines how existing asymmetries 
in terms of wealth and power create an uneven play-
ing field for the potential participants in a scheme.
According to Friedman et al. (2018), distributive 
equity was the dimension most observed in empirical 
studies, addressing questions of access to the PES 
scheme and its outcomes (e.g. financial resources, 
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livelihoods and well-being). In contrast, procedural 
and recognitional equity were less studied. Most of 
those studies (76%) found that conservation measures 
were often leading to negative or mixed equity out-
comes (all types of equity taken together), while 
a minority (13%) was leading to positive outcomes.
While Friedman et al. (2018) argue that contextual 
equity was providing background rather than a focus 
of analysis, we found that many published studies 
(Zbinden and Lee 2005; Corbera et al. 2007, 2009; 
Pagiola 2008; Muradian et al. 2010; Porras 2010; 
García-Amado et al. 2011; Garbach et al. 2012; 
Mahanty et al. 2013; Bremer et al. 2014; Haas et al. 
2019) identified elements of contextual equity that 
influenced landholders’ ability to participate and/or 
benefit from PES schemes. Two factors were often 
observed as playing an important role in landholders’ 
ability to participate in PES schemes: i) land tenure/ 
rights; and ii) size of the land. Indeed, individuals 
who do not hold formal rights or title on land are 
often unable to participate or derive full financial 
benefits (Pagiola 2008; Corbera et al. 2009; 
García-Amado et al. 2011; Haas et al. 2019). In 
other cases, it has been shown that larger landowners 
and private companies were often benefitting from 
PES, while smaller landholders had more difficulty 
accessing the scheme (Zbinden and Lee 2005; 
Muradian et al. 2010; Porras 2010; Bremer et al. 
2014). Other factors such as wealth, education, gen-
der, ethnicity, social status/standing, as well as nego-
tiating skills have often been identified as influencing 
PES participation (Mahanty et al. 2013; Haas et al. 
2019). In addition, potential participants’ access to 
the scheme is also determined by their ability to 
access information, knowledge and networks 
(Corbera et al. 2007; Garbach et al. 2012).
Our study focuses on the question of access to 
participation of landholders in the biobanking 
scheme. This question relates to the distributive 
equity of the scheme, as well as to the broader con-
textual equity components that may influence distri-
butive equity (see Figure 1).
3. Methods
3.1. Case study
This project employed a case study of the biobanking 
scheme. The case study focused specifically on the 
Greater Sydney Metropolitan area, as nearly half of 
the BioBanking agreements (84 of 179, or 47%) are in 
this area (see Figure 2). This is likely to continue in 
the future as most of the planned development 
in NSW is for the Greater Metropolitan Sydney area.
The case study addresses six local government 
areas (LGAs): the Wollondilly Shire Council, 
Penrith City Council, The Hills Shire Council, 
Camden Council, Campbelltown City Council and 
the Hawkesbury City Council. These areas represent 
a range of situations within the Greater Sydney area 
(see Figure 3). While Campbelltown and Penrith are 
largely developed local government areas close to 
Sydney, Camden, Wollondilly and The Hills Shires 
are situated further away from Sydney and still have 
extensive bushlands while being under pressure for 
development. Finally, the Hawkesbury represents the 
Figure 1. Equity dimensions for consideration during three phases of a scheme – design, implementation & management and 
outcomes. The phases of the scheme and equity dimensions we will focus on in this paper are in orange.
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other end of the spectrum, with an area that is largely 
preserved and encounters less development pressures. 
Our selected LGAs also represent different degrees of 
participation in the scheme, with Wollondilly, 
Penrith and The Hills participating actively (29, 14 
and 9 contracts, respectively), while Camden, 
Campbelltown and Hawkesbury’s participation is 
minimal (5, 4 and 2 contracts).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
A total of 30 interviews were conducted: 24 inter-
views on 24 properties with 34 landholders (both 
participants and non-participants in the biobanking 
scheme) and six interviews with staff from local 
and state governments, a representative of an envir-
onmental association (Landcare) and consultants 
working with suppliers and buyers of offsets. In 
Figure 2. BioBanking agreements per region between May 2010 and May 2019.
Figure 3. BioBanking agreements in the Greater Metropolitan Sydney area between May 2010 and May 2019 and Council areas 
considered in our study.
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this paper, we will mostly focus on the landholder 
interviews and only marginally draw on the six 
interviews with other stakeholders. This is why we 
will only describe the recruitment process in regard 
to landholders. To recruit landholders, we con-
tacted agencies, organisations and associations that 
work with landholders, such as the Wollondilly 
Shire Council, the Greater Sydney Local Land 
Services, the Razorback Environment Protection 
Society, the Greater Sydney Landcare, the 
Menangle Fox Control Group and the MacDonald 
Valley association. Staff members or volunteers in 
those agencies/organisations/associations shared 
a summary of our research with their members 
through emails or Facebook advertisement. We 
also publicised our project in two local newspapers 
in the Camden and Wollondilly area: Camden 
Advertiser and Wollondilly Advertiser. We then 
employed snowball sampling to recruit additional 
participants. Table 1 summarises the characteristics 
of the landholders interviewed. Prior to the inter-
view, participants were given a consent form. Each 
participant agreed to the terms and signed the 
consent form.
Regarding the degree of awareness of the scheme, 
the landholders interviewed were situated on a broad 
spectrum from no awareness of offsets and of the 
scheme to being participants in the biobanking 
scheme (see Figure 4).
Interviews were carried out face-to-face, usually on 
the landholder’s property, and sometimes in a public 
place of their choice. Interviews lasted 60 to 90 min-
utes on average and were all recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. The interviews were semi-directed, 
and structured around three main sections: 
1. Characteristics of the landholder/institution and 
the land; 2. Landholders’ experiences with and per-
spectives on the scheme6; and 3. Factors influencing 
decision-making regarding private land conservation 
(see Appendix A). The interview transcripts were 
systematically analysed using the NVivo software. 
Initial thematic coding was used in order to induc-
tively identify themes of importance. Emerging 
themes were then grouped in broader categories 
identified deductively from literature.
4. Results
This section presents the ‘contextual’ factors suggest-
ing distributive inequity among landholders in terms 
of access to the scheme. We first present the factors 
that enable entrepreneurs, public landholders, reli-
gious communities and a few farmers (i.e. graziers) 
to participate in the scheme. We will then present the 
factors that prevent or discourage individual land-
holders (e.g. farmers and rural-residential land-
holders) to participate.
Table 1. Characteristics of the landholders interviewed.
Characteristics
Participants in the biobanking 
scheme
Non-participants in the biobanking 
scheme
Types of properties 2 religious congregations 




9 rural-residential landholders 
2 farmers – horticulture 
2 hobby farmers
Proportion of land under BioBanking (participants)/Property size (non- 
participants)
23 hectares to several hundred** From 2 to 100 hectares
Age of landholders 29 to 68 years 2 interviewees were in their 50s 
18 interviewees were over 60
Location Wollondilly Shire 
City of Penrith 
Camden Shire 
City of Campbelltown 
Sydney basin and regional NSW
Wollondilly Shire 
The Hills Shire 
City of Penrith 
City of Hawkesbury
*Bought a property that was already under BioBanking. 
**One participant owns several properties. 
Figure 4. Interviewees’ position on the spectrum going from non-participation to participation.
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4.1. Contextual factors enabling participation in 
the scheme
Participants in the biobanking scheme often did so 
because they: i) were able to develop a good understand-
ing of the scheme; ii) were able to identify whether the 
scheme was relevant to their property; iii) had the 
resources to go through the assessment process; 
iv) knew that they would be able to sell their credits; 
and v) were confident they could comply with the tech-
nical requirements of the scheme. As a result, the scheme 
often emerged as a low-risk endeavour with the potential 
to bring benefits. This point is illustrated by a landholder 
who commented that ‘the risk-reward of the business, it 
made sense. The risk was low, the potential rewards were 
good. So, that sounded good to me.’
The contextual factors that explain their low-risk 
perception are: i) experience; ii) resources; and iii) access 
to information and support through formal and infor-
mal networks. While participant landholders did not 
necessarily benefit from all those contextual factors. 
They often benefitted from one or several of them.
When relating their experience of entering into the 
scheme, several participants, mainly public land-
holders and entrepreneurs, showed how their previous 
experience with the scheme (or offsets more gener-
ally), as well as their ability to independently source 
relevant information, enabled them to develop a good 
understanding of the functioning of the scheme. For 
example, one staff member of a Council participating 
in the scheme explained that his previous position in 
an environmental management company led him to be 
involved in the development of several biobanking 
sites and to develop ‘a bit of understanding about 
how it sort of worked’. Another landholder, an entre-
preneur with a long business experience and involve-
ment in environmental management, explained how 
he consulted ‘primary’ data on the biobanking scheme, 
such as the legislation and the BioBanking register – 
where supply and demand for credits are displayed – 
to understand whether there would be demand for the 
scheme:
I just looked up the legislation and just ferreted 
through the sites, looked at the BioBanking register. 
There had been sales made. The legislation was 
obviously leading to demand because there were 
infrastructure projects coming and developers had 
the opportunity to participate in the scheme rather 
than using the species impact statements. 
In addition to experience, several participants 
explained that they had access to financial and staff 
resources. Access to these resources often enabled 
them to start the process of entering the scheme by 
paying for the ecological assessment of their land,7 as 
well as to negotiate the conditions of their participa-
tion in the scheme. One Council staff member 
explains that the Council had the financial resources 
to pay a consultant to carry out the assessment of 
their land. Their good understanding of the scheme 
also led them to develop certainty about the financial 
viability of the Scheme: ‘We knew that we were going 
to generate a significant amount of money from it. 
So, it [assessment costs] was something that we could 
just cover through internal budgets to make that 
happen.’ The availability of skilled staff resources, 
such as lawyers and property managers, provided 
support to several types of participants, such as public 
landholders and religious congregations. Indeed, 
while a Council staff member explained that the 
lawyers and property managers of the Council pro-
vided advice about credit prices, a representative of 
a religious community explained that some of their 
staff provided support during the application process. 
This participant contrasts the position of her com-
munity with the position of individual landholders 
(i.e. the ‘Joe Bloke’ referred to in the quote below), 
stressing that the latter do not necessarily have the 
resources to go through this process:
We spent a lot of money on our staff that were highly 
skilled and highly paid staff, really. One was a lawyer, 
spent a lot of time down here or negotiating with the 
Office of Environment and Heritage. Now we 
endorsed that, because we said, ‘That’s our commit-
ment’, but it’s a very costly thing and I think if you 
were ‘Joe Bloke’ down the road and you didn’t have 
a strong commitment to it or you didn’t have 
resources, negotiating that can be difficult. 
A third, essential contextual factor that explains the 
ability of entrepreneurs, public landholders, religious 
congregations and some graziers to participate in the 
scheme is their ability to access information and sup-
port through formal and informal networks. Several 
participants stressed the importance of support (tech-
nical and financial) and information received through 
formal networks, that is, staff members from govern-
ment agencies. One Council staff member explained 
that when the Council was working on its application, 
the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH), which 
was managing the scheme at the time, was in the 
process of ‘contacting all the councils with all the 
relevant information and holding forums and stuff. 
That was quite easy for us to be able to get up to 
speed with what was required’. Another participant, 
the representative of a religious community, explained 
that he received information and technical/financial 
support from an OEH liaison officer who carried out 
the assessment of the land.8 For him, it was this initial 
support that enabled his community to make 
a decision regarding participation:
When I first met the people from the OEH who 
came out for a preliminary survey, that went on to 
become a lot clearer what was involved, and they 
were most helpful. [. . .] It was that contact that 
helped us to decide. 
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In addition to information and support received 
through formal social networks, many participants 
stressed the importance of their more informal social 
networks for the provision of information and sup-
port around the scheme. For example, one entrepre-
neurial landholder9, who works in an environmental 
management company, stated that receiving informa-
tion from a colleague and acquaintances who are 
directly involved in the scheme, was crucial for him 
to develop a good understanding of the scheme:
If me as an individual heard about biobanking, get-
ting all the information myself, I think [it] would be 
a lot more challenging than what it is now that I’ve 
sort of come into this company and I learn off [name 
of the colleague] and I learn off [name of the 
acquaintance] about the whole, you know, aspect of 
biobanking. 
For another participant, one of the graziers participating 
in the scheme, informal social networks provided reas-
surance regarding one’s ability to meet the scheme’s 
requirements. This grazier had several friends who par-
ticipate in the scheme. As a result, seeing them mana-
ging their land to meet the Scheme’s requirements 
provided him with the confidence that he would be 
able to do the same: ‘I think I knew enough people 
who’d done it to know that they’d got through all of 
that [management of the land] without too much 
concern.’
Beyond opportunities for sharing information and 
experience, formal and informal networks also provide 
direct support to potential participants, notably through 
providing ‘brokering’ services between suppliers and 
buyers of credits. In the case of one grazier participating 
in the scheme, it was the consultant in charge of the 
assessment who identified a developer willing to pur-
chase the credits generated on the land. In other cases, it 
is landholders participating in the scheme who identify 
potential buyers for landholders. Two participants 
explain that one of their friends, an entrepreneurial 
landholder with multiple bio-banked properties, has 
connections with developers, enabling this individual 
to bundle credits together and sell them to developers. 
Finally, one grazier explains that he did not raise buyer 
interest in offsets from his land when he put an expres-
sion of interest on the OEH credit register, but was able 
to sell his credits when a friend participating in the 
scheme put him in direct contact with a developer look-
ing to offset its impact:
We didn’t actually own credits, but we were able to 
show that there was a potential of credits on the 
website. I can’t remember again exactly when that 
was. We did that but then nothing really happened. 
No one showed any great interest until about 2016 
and then that was actually through [landholder’s 
name], had been approached by a company called 
[name of the company], developers: ‘We’re looking 
for more credits’. And they gave us the impetus. 
4.2. Factors preventing participation in the 
scheme
Interviewees not participating in the scheme are 
mostly farmers and rural-residential landholders. In 
contrast with participants, non-participants perceive 
the scheme as a risky endeavour. The non- 
participants interviewed identified many areas of 
uncertainties.
A few non-participants expressed uncertainty around 
the number of credits that would be generated on their 
land and the financial benefit they would derive from 
the scheme. Those landholders were particularly inter-
ested in understanding whether the biobanking benefits 
would match the opportunity cost of not developing the 
land for residential purposes:
What I’m trying to do is to find out: is it commer-
cially viable for me to look at bio banking? [. . .] 
I haven’t come to a conclusion yet. [. . .] See, the 
land is worth millions, to subdivide. [. . .] So, the 
biodiversity has got to match, not necessarily 
a match, but give me an income that I can live 
well on. 
A second concern of non-participants is their ability to 
meet the scheme’s requirements in terms of land man-
agement. Two interviewees were particularly concerned 
about the emergence of new weeds and the impact these 
could have on their ability to meet the management 
requirements (see Cooke and Corbo-Perkins 2018 for 
similar findings). To illustrate this point, one interviewee 
offers:
How do they know how much it’s going to cost to do 
that? What if you run out of money? [. . .] The vari-
able here is the additional weeds coming from out-
side. As I said, 10 years ago we didn’t have Chilean 
Needle Grass. We didn’t have African Lovegrass. 
A part of that scheme is they don’t want that on 
this property. That’s extremely difficult to control. 
Finally, many non-participants were planning to 
eventually downsize and sell their property. They, 
therefore, had questions on how biobanking would 
impact their ability to sell their land. Some land-
holders could be facing financial hardship if they 
were unable to sell their property.
The lack of certainty around several dimensions of 
the scheme and its subsequent perception as a risky 
endeavour can be partially explained by non- 
participants’ experience with the scheme. The two 
non-participants who enquired about the scheme and 
the landholder whose property was in the process of 
being assessed at the time of interview did not benefit 
from the various resources (i.e. experience, resources 
and access to information and support through formal 
and informal networks) available to the participating 
landholders. Rather, they mostly consulted the online 
information made available by the agencies managing 
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the scheme. They often described this information as 
‘inconclusive’, ‘confusing’ and ‘piecemeal’. Out of the 
three landholders, one contacted a consultant and 
rapidly found that his property was too small to be 
viable, while another hesitated to pay for an initial 
assessment of his property at the time of the interview. 
The third one went ahead and paid for a preliminary 
assessment of his property. However, in addition to 
online information, the third landholder benefited 
from the visit of a GSLLS liaison officer who provided 
him with information on the scheme and advised him 
that he considered his land as suitable for the scheme:
A fellow [. . .] came out to the property from Local 
Land Services. [. . .] He spent about three hours here 
- lovely guy - and explained a lot, and thought it was 
quite suitable for biobanking, and he identified 
Cumberland Plain Land Snails on the property, 
which is an endangered species. 
When asked if he would have been more wary of continu-
ing to explore biobanking further had the GSLLS liaison 
officer not come to his property, this landholder offered: ‘I 
don’t know where I would’ve gone next. I was basically just 
stumbling around, so [. . .] he was able to verify what I was 
suspecting, that it might be worthwhile.’ We can therefore 
see that the provision of information in the form of 
a property visit by a liaison officer was of importance to 
this landholder. In addition, many non-participants said 
that the upfront assessment costs ($AUD 20,000–30,000) 
were a major hindrance to their participation.
Besides experience, resources and access to informa-
tion, another contextual factor plays an important role in 
hindering participation: land size. A consultant inter-
viewed explained that although the scheme does not 
have minimal land size requirements, in practice high 
assessment and administrative cost outweigh income 
from offsets on small properties. Still according to this 
consultant, while those costs can represent 25% of the 
total management costs for a small landholder, they can 
drop to 5% for larger land sizes. As a result, the scheme is 
more attractive to participants able to achieve economies 
of scale by putting large tracts of land under biobanking 
agreements. This means that currently the scheme is not 
accessible to smaller landholders. The minimum lot size 
to make the scheme viable depended on the area and 
relevant credit price in that area. According to 
a consultant interviewed, the minimum lot size for 
Western Sydney, where many of our interviewees lived, 
is 15–20 hectares. While all participating landholders 
were able to put more than 20 hectares of land under 
biobanking, many non-participants reside on relatively 
small properties, some as small as two hectares.
4.3. Synthesis of findings
Our findings show that several ‘contextual’ factors 
cause distributive inequity in access to biobanking 
in NSW. Participants were, before joining, often 
able to develop a better understanding of the scheme 
and a stronger confidence in their ability to partici-
pate. Factors at play included their experience/exper-
tise, their resources (financial, skilled staff), their 
ability to access information and support through 
formal and informal social networks, and the size of 
their land. In contrast, non-participants failed to 
develop sufficient understanding of the scheme or 
resolve their doubts about its suitability for their 
specific property and situation more generally. Non- 
participants who enquired about the scheme had 
mostly consulted online information, which did not 
provide sufficient certainty about their ability to par-
ticipate. They did not have prior experience with the 
scheme or the support of a formal or informal net-
work. Additionally, they often do not have the finan-
cial resources to pay for the ecological assessment and 
are often living on land that might be too small to 
make it a viable endeavour. Those circumstances 
often discouraged them from engaging further in 
the scheme.
We observe that landholders who successfully go 
through the process often receive additional information 
and support to what is normally provided. At the initial 
stage of information gathering, participants had access 
to individualised information and support. At the assess-
ment stage, those who may not have had the financial 
resources necessary to pay for a consultant received 
financial support for the assessment. Finally, at the credit 
sale stage, participants had access to informal networks 
that played a brokering role and enabled them to sell 
their credits (see Figure 5).
5. Discussion
We have identified the factors enabling some land-
holders to participate in the scheme while preventing 
others to do so. This section explores what non- 
participants in the biobanking scheme would need to 
be able to participate and provides recommendations for 
improving the equity in access to the biobanking scheme 
in NSW and biodiversity offsets more generally. We also 
reflect on equity in access to biodiversity offsets in 
a developed country context.
5.1. What non-participants would need to 
participate in the scheme
Participants in the biobanking scheme had expertise 
and access to resources, information, support. These 
were not available to non-participating landholders. 
While non-participants confirmed the importance of 
access to individualised information and support 
through formal and informal networks, as well as 
the need for financial support for the ecological 
assessment of the land, they also put strong emphasis 
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on a notion that remained relatively implicit in parti-
cipants’ responses: social networks and trust. This 
justifies a brief exploration of how social networks 
and trust are considered as essential by non- 
participants.
Other research on landholder participation in private 
land conservation programs has shown that social capi-
tal, particularly social networks and trust, is often an 
enabler (Garbach et al. 2012; Bremer et al. 2014; Lastra- 
Bravo et al. 2015; Taylor and Van Grieken 2015). Social 
capital refers to the relationships within or between 
social groups that enable collaboration. It has three 
components: social networks, trust and social norms 
(Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993). Social 
networks refer to the formal and informal connections 
within and between social groups. Three types of social 
networks have been identified: bonding, bridging and 
linking networks (Woolcock 1998; Putnam 2000). 
Bonding refers to ties within a social group, bridging 
to the connections between different social groups and 
linking to the connections between social groups with 
different levels of power and authority. Regarding trust, 
two types of trust have been identified: social trust, that 
is the trust developed between members of the same 
social group; and institutional trust, that is the trust of 
individuals in government or political parties for exam-
ple (Jones et al. 2009). Finally, norms refer to the rules 
that govern the behaviours of members of a social 
group.
Non-participants explained that the presence of brid-
ging social networks, as well as institutional trust would 
be essential for them to consider participating in biodi-
versity offsets. Many of them explained that they would 
like to receive individual face-to-face advice on their 
property in the form of a visiting liaison officer. This 
could be considered as a ‘pre-assessment’ that would 
help landholders understand whether their property is 
suitable for the scheme, avoiding early misinterpretation. 
Currently, such pre-assessments do exist, but they are 
done by consultants, and even though they are consid-
ered as relatively low-cost, the fees charged may still be 
prohibitive for some landholders, particularly if the 
uncertainty regarding the scheme is high. This insight 
is in line with some of the literature on landholder 
participation in conservation programs. For example, 
Moore and Renton (2002, 2011) observed that land-
holders are often more responsive to site-specific infor-
mation provided through one-on-one interactions with 
a qualified individual. When asked who those ‘liaison 
officers’ should be, certain non-participants referred to 
their existing networks, notably liaison officers from 
GSLLS who they consider trustworthy. Trust was built 
through the development of an ongoing and long- 
lasting relationship, and through GSLLS liaison officers 
showcasing dependability through long-term involve-
ment in the area, as well as competence: ‘She’s been 
working with the valley for 20 years or something and 
I completely trust her and she’s incredibly practical and 
sensible.’ While no consistent definition of the compo-
nents of trust exists, elements such as dependability, 
competence and care have been identified as important 
(Fisher 2013). Other non-participants also explained 
how GSLLS liaison officers were providing them with 
direct support, by helping them filling grant applications 
for example. These findings are in agreement with some 
of the literature on landholder participation showing 
that support from extension officers, technical advisers 
or government institutions, as well as the trust devel-
oped by landholders in representatives of those institu-
tions (i.e. bridging social capital), can explain landholder 
participation rates (Mettepenningen et al. 2011; 
Morrison et al. 2011; Cooke et al. 2012; Lastra-Bravo 
et al. 2015). Other non-participants, without existing 
social networks for biodiversity management, also 
expressed the need to be provided with face-to-face 
advice on their property. However, they did not nomi-
nate specific entities they would prefer to receive the 
information from.
Non-participants also mentioned the importance of 
bonding social capital, through interactions with land-
holders participating in the scheme. One interviewee 
explains that visiting properties that are already partici-
pating in the scheme would enable landholders to get ‘a 
better sense of if it’s doable, or it’ possible. Otherwise, it’s 
Figure 5. Factors that enable participants in the scheme to go through each step of the process – ‘normal’ process is described 
on each dot, and the additional support received by participating landholders is described under the arrows.
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just theoretical. [. . .] By talking to people where it does 
work, you believe it more’. Bonding social capital has 
also been shown as important as relationships with 
other landholders enable landholders to i) obtain infor-
mation, ii) observe their practices and discuss manage-
ment decisions and iii) gain insights on their perspective 
on the program (Cooke et al. 2012; Garbach et al. 2012; 
Lastra-Bravo et al. 2015).
5.2. Recommendations for New South Wales and 
elsewhere
Our findings suggest that equity in access to the bio-
banking scheme and other similar schemes could be 
improved in several ways.
Firstly, it is essential for potential participants to be 
able to get a ‘pre-assessment’ of their property in the 
form of the visit of a qualified liaison officer. A pre- 
assessment could be carried out by liaison officers or 
technical advisors from local government agencies (e.g. 
GSLLS) who have already existing networks at the local 
scale and are trusted by landholders. Another possibility 
would be for the responsible government agency to 
engage in trust-building activities with landholders. 
This might be particularly relevant for landholders 
who do not belong to existing networks.
Secondly, financial support for the ecological assess-
ment costs could be contemplated. For example, the 
costs could be borne by other stakeholders involved in 
the scheme, such as the developers or the government 
agency managing the scheme. The costs could be 
deducted from credit sale. To do so, the landholder 
would need to commit to participation before the assess-
ment is carried out. This reinforces the need for the 
landholder to have a good understanding of the scheme 
and its feasibility on his/her property before assessment. 
It is therefore of paramount importance that landholders 
have capacity to develop their understanding of the 
scheme through information and support provided by 
formal and informal networks beforehand. This could, 
for example, be achieved through landholder groups, 
where non-participating landholders would visit the 
properties of participating landholders.
Thirdly, the importance of brokering services should 
be acknowledged. Participating landholders explained 
that their ability to identify a buyer was often made 
possible through brokering. A more transparent broker-
ing system where brokers are clearly identified and can 
be accessed by all landholders would potentially lead to 
a more equitable system. However, brokering services 
fees would remain and this could lead to new inequities 
where such fees would be prohibitive for some land-
holders. The current situation of the biobanking scheme 
could see an improvement in this regard as the 
Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT), the new govern-
ment agency in charge of managing the scheme, is 
increasingly using biodiversity credit tenders and fixed- 
price offers to sell biodiversity credits. With these efforts, 
the BCT effectively assumes the role of a broker between 
buyers and sellers of biodiversity credits. This brokering 
could enable landholders who do not benefit from the 
informal brokering system in existence, to still access the 
market and sell their credits without incurring propor-
tionally prohibitive initial costs.
Elements of the three recommendations above, nota-
bly the call for more collaboration between liaison offi-
cers and potential scheme participants or between 
potential participants and landholders already participat-
ing in the scheme, challenge an important aspect of the 
biobanking scheme: competition between participants in 
the market. While we acknowledge that there may be 
tension between collaboration and competition, we 
believe that three arguments land in favour of promot-
ing more and better collaboration.
The first argument has already been developed at 
length earlier, i.e. that participants in the scheme were 
able to benefit from collaborative relationships to enter 
the scheme, and that non-participants do not have 
access to these relationships. This goes to show that 
participation in the scheme is already exhibiting 
a hybrid of competition and collaboration, but that not 
all landholders benefit from collaboration. Enhancing 
the collaborative dimension of the scheme, for example, 
through pre-assessment and landholder groups, would 
redress this imbalance by providing opportunities for 
collaboration to all.
The second argument in favour of the enhancement 
of collaboration in the scheme is that in order to be 
effective, conservation efforts need to be undertaken at 
the landscape-scale (Opdam 2014; Cooke and Moon 
2015). As a result, it is therefore important to encourage 
participants to communicate and share knowledge with 
other participants beyond the boundaries of their prop-
erties. Even though the landholders involved in the 
scheme might not be neighbours at this point in time, 
fostering collaboration between landholders can be 
important in the long term as it could lead to better 
cross-boundary management once more adjoining 
properties participate. In sum, collaboration might foster 
both ‘ecologies of scale’ and ‘economies of scale’, reflect-
ing potentially non-linear gains from collaboration in 
terms of biodiversity outcomes (through enhanced eco-
logical connectivity at the landscape scale) as well as 
costs (through, e.g. shared resources for ecological man-
agement and restoration as will be suggested below).
Finally, public agencies normatively set the rules that 
are expected to lead to positive ecological outcomes, as 
well as positive social and equity outcomes, even though 
these have been less of a priority or focus. As a result, it 
would be expected that public agencies intervene to foster 
a balance between competition and collaboration, in 
order to reach more positive ecological outcomes (i.e. 
better conservation across property boundaries) and 
social and equity outcomes (i.e. improved landholder 
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access to the scheme). Indeed, the above argument of 
ecologies and economies of scale would apply here as 
well.
Our fourth and last recommendation relates to small 
landholdings. In our study, non-participants often hold 
smaller lands. Facilitating small landholders’ participa-
tion might therefore contribute to enabling the partici-
pation of non-participant landholders. The main barrier 
to small landholders’ participation is the costs associated 
with ecological assessments, as mentioned earlier, but 
the administration and management costs (administra-
tion costs are part of the management costs in the form 
of Part A payment9) also pose barriers. According to a 
consultant interviewed, administration costs are uni-
form across property size. For small landholders, who 
might generate a limited amount of credits, the admin-
istration costs can represent a high proportion of the 
Part A payment, not yielding enough money for the 
costs related to actual land management. As such, the 
scheme is financially non-viable for small landholders. 
A first step towards facilitating smaller landholders’ 
participation could be to make the administration 
costs (e.g. annual reporting, annual compliance fees, 
etc.) proportional to land size. A second step could be 
to minimise costs associated with the management of 
the land. This could be done by encouraging the collec-
tive management of land for smaller properties, creating 
economies of scale and diminishing costs. While con-
servation programs, such as agri-environmental 
schemes (Franks and McGloin 2007; Prager et al. 
2012) encourage collective applications and manage-
ment of land by landholders, collective applications 
may not be possible for the biobanking scheme due to 
legal difficulties (the agreement is tied to the land title). 
However, adjoining neighbours wanting to individually 
apply to the scheme could agree to handle the land 
management collectively and share the costs. These 
two steps would lead to diminished administration 
and management costs for individual landholders, 
increasing the likelihood of making applying to the 
scheme financially viable for those smaller landholders. 
We could consider that encouraging the participation of 
smaller landholders is of no importance as they would 
only generate limited positive ecological outcomes. 
However, it could be argued that engaging with those 
smaller landholders could have some positive equity 
outcomes. We will discuss the importance of consider-
ing equity outcomes and striking a balance between 
ecological and equity outcomes in the next section.
5.3. Does equity in access to biodiversity offsets 
matter in a developed country context?
Most of the literature on equity in biodiversity offsets or 
PES focuses on developing countries. In a developing 
country context, PES are often considered as beneficial 
for social and economic development of the poorer and/ 
or more marginalised constituents of society. As a result, 
in addition to environmental goals, PES aim to alleviate 
poverty, reinforce the rights of local and indigenous 
people and/or promote rural development. The concep-
tion of distributive justice adopted by those PES is based 
on need. That is, the schemes aim at rewarding the 
individuals that need it the most. In the Greater 
Sydney Metropolitan area, as in many developed country 
contexts, landholder poverty and marginalisation are 
relative. As such, does social equity matter? Or should 
the focus be solely on ecological outcomes? This leads us 
to ask two sub-questions: i) What type of social equity 
could matter in the Greater Sydney Metropolitan area 
context? ii) Should there be a hierarchy between ecolo-
gical and equity outcomes?
There are four grounds on which to consider the 
importance of social equity: i) egalitarianism, ii) need; 
iii) merit and iv) common good (McDermott et al. 
2013). We briefly consider how each argument might 
apply in the Australian context. If we follow the prin-
ciple of ‘egalitarianism’, or equality in the distribution 
of benefits, it could be argued that every landholder 
should have a ‘fair go’ at accessing the scheme. The 
‘fair go’ represents a deeply ingrained Australian socie-
tal value. For small landholders who are currently 
excluded from the NSW scheme, such as farmers and 
rural-residential landholders, other equity-related argu-
ments emerge. When considering farmers, the eco-
nomic viability of farming operations is progressively 
degrading, threatening farmers’ livelihoods. 
Consequently, biodiversity offsets can be considered 
as a mechanism enabling them to derive another 
stream of income and to remain on their land. Here, 
we can see the ‘need-based’ argument re-emerge. 
Indeed, farmers would potentially be the ones needing 
to benefit from the scheme, as their livelihood is most 
immediately threatened. There also exists a ‘common 
good’ argument regarding the ability of agricultural 
producers to participate in the scheme, as maintaining 
agricultural production in proximity to cities has the 
potential to contribute to the greater good through, for 
example, provision of fresh food, maintenance of land-
scape quality. If we consider rural-residential land-
holders, we can argue that if those landholders want 
to undertake conservation work on their property, they 
will most likely need to do so with their own funds 
and with the occasional support of small grants. This 
was the case for many of the non-participant rural- 
residential landholders interviewed in this study. The 
landholders able to participate in the scheme have their 
management costs compensated, while non-participant 
rural-residential landholders, are to fund their own 
management cost. A merit-based argument (i.e. 
rewards should be proportional to inputs) could be 
developed here, and it could be argued that rural- 
residential landholders should be compensated in 
accordance with their level of input.
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Clearly, the question of the need for equity in incen-
tive-based conservation schemes prompts different con-
siderations in developing and developed countries. 
However, even if poverty alleviation is deemed irrele-
vant in the context of biobanking in NSW, we can see 
that the need for distributive justice can be framed in 
different ways: i) promotion of egalitarianism, so that all 
landholders can have a fair go; ii) adoption of the need- 
based principle, which argues that farmers should be 
provided with an alternative income stream, as their 
livelihoods are threatened; iii) promotion of the merit- 
based principle, which argues that landholders should 
be compensated based on their inputs; and iv) the 
common good argument.
Once the type of equity that needs to be promoted is 
determined, the interactions between ecological and 
equity outcomes need to be scrutinised, and an under-
standing of the trade-offs between the two needs to be 
developed. The relationship between equity and ecolo-
gical outcomes can be articulated around the following 
questions: Should ecological gains be the only criteria to 
consider for the implementation of a biodiversity offset 
scheme? Or should all landholders be able to participate 
in the biobanking scheme regardless of the ecological 
gains they provide?
At one end of the spectrum, it could be argued that 
the biobanking scheme should simply be efficient: 
generating the highest ecological outcomes at the 
lowest cost. If we adopt this vision of the scheme, it 
seems only logical that landholders providing high 
ecological outcomes will be able to participate, while 
landholders who can only provide low ecological out-
comes will be excluded. At the other end of the 
spectrum, it could be argued that providing equitable 
outcomes (regardless of which type of equity is cho-
sen) should be the main objective. This could lead, in 
contrast, to poor ecological outcomes and high 
administration costs for government agencies. 
Moreover, this vision would indeed defeat the pur-
pose of most contemporary biodiversity policy 
formulations.
An intermediary position would suggest that while 
ecological outcomes are a priority for the biobanking 
scheme, and biodiversity offset schemes more gener-
ally, ensuring that the scheme has positive equity 
outcomes could be considered as a complementary 
benefit of the scheme. Therefore, we do not argue 
that equity should be the priority of the biobanking 
scheme, or that equity amounts to all landholders 
being able to participate regardless of the ecological 
value of their land. Rather, we offer that equity out-
comes should not be dismissed in the design and 
operation of such schemes, and that in addition to 
determining normative rules regarding ecological 
outcomes (e.g. which natural habitats are considered 
equivalent), it is important for such schemes to also 
consider equity outcomes.
Considering equity outcomes implies determining 
whether it is important for the scheme to provide support 
to landholders who might be at a disadvantage. The 
reasons to provide support to those landholders might 
vary from scheme to scheme, depending on the type of 
equity sought (e.g. egalitarianism, need, merit or com-
mon good) and the types of landholders present in the 
geographical area to which the specific scheme applies. If 
the scheme is perceived as having potential to improve 
equity in a specific area, the next step is then to identify 
the potential trade-offs – or synergies – between ecologi-
cal and equity outcomes and find thresholds at which 
both ecological and equity outcomes can be met. Those 
thresholds need to be determined at the time of designing 
the scheme and need to correspond to the values and 
expectations of the stakeholders that will take part in the 
scheme.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that biodiversity offsets in NSW are 
currently inequitable in terms of landholder access to 
the scheme. Landholders with more experience, 
resources and access to support and information 
through formal and informal networks and larger prop-
erties are able to participate, while landholders who do 
not benefit from such advantages are not. The latter 
category of landholders represents rural-residential 
landholders, and farmers often owning smaller proper-
ties. As biodiversity offsets are often presented as aiming 
to achieve the highest biodiversity outcomes at the low-
est cost, it might not be seen as necessary to include 
landholders who might provide lower biodiversity out-
comes at a potentially higher marginal cost (administra-
tion costs). While we do not argue that equity should 
necessarily prevail in biodiversity offsets (considering 
that biodiversity outcomes are the main policy objec-
tive), we offer that equity considerations should not be 
ignored in biodiversity offset policy, and that striking 
a balance between ecological and equity outcomes is 
necessary and, when done well, might enhance overall 
ecological, economic and social outcomes. A pragmatic 
reason for a ‘middle ground’ position on equity is that 
longevity and legitimacy of a biodiversity offset scheme 
often derive from landholders’ and communities’ per-
ception of the scheme as being fair and equitable 
(Narloch et al. 2013). Therefore, considering those 
issues might be of importance if these schemes aim at 
being long lasting. A normative reason for this could be 
that sustainable development is meant to have positive 
environmental, economic and social outcomes, there-
fore it is impossible to think about environmental out-
comes, without considering its social dimension.
In this paper, equity has only been considered for one 
conservation mechanism in NSW, the biobanking 
scheme. However, other conservation mechanisms exist 
in NSW, such as the Conservation Management Program 
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for example. Further study could consider the question of 
equity across several conservation programs in NSW, as it 
is possible that, while individual schemes might not 
necessarily be equitable, the full suite of schemes available 
across NSW may provide a certain level of equity. 
Another priority for further study would be to look at 
whether a scheme such as biobanking has the potential to 
be adopted by indigenous landholders in NSW.
Notes
1. PES can be defined as: (1) voluntary transactions (2) 
between service users (3) and service providers (4) 
that are conditional on agreed rules of natural 
resource management (5) for generating offsite ser-
vices (Wunder 2015, p. 241).
2. This Act aimed at regulating land clearing in rural 
areas of NSW. Landholders who wanted to clear 
part of their land were required to develop 
a Native Vegetation Plan where they agreed to offset 
the impact of clearing a part of their property by 
setting aside and improving the state of land with 
a high conservation value in other parts of their 
property.
3. Biodiversity Certification enabled planning authori-
ties to undertake a streamlined biodiversity assess-
ment project, at the landscape scale, for areas 
identified as development areas during the strategic 
planning process.
4. The policy aimed at clarifying and standardising the 
offset process for major projects (state significant 
development and infrastructure).
5. These empirical categories have been identified 
based on landholders’ legal status, as well as the 
‘motivations’ that explain their participation in the 
scheme (e.g. public landholders need to derive 
funds to manage public lands, while entrepreneur-
ial landholders buy land strategically to make 
a profit).
6. At the time of study, no significant changes had 
been made regarding the process of landholder par-
ticipation between the BioBanking and the BOS. As 
a result, we could interview landholders’ having 
engaged with the BioBanking or the BOS, without 
that impacting our findings.
7. For landholders who did not have knowledge of the 
scheme, the questions were framed around the char-
acteristics a scheme would need to have and the type 
of support/information they would need to be pro-
vided to find it attractive. This line of questioning 
led landholders to talk about positive experience 
they had with other conservation programs, usually 
grants from the Local Land Services.
8. The ecological assessment determines the type and 
number of credits present on a property.
9. This landholder was in the process of participating 
in the biobanking scheme. However, we included 
him in the ‘participant’ category as he was not see-
ing any obstacle to his future participation, beside 
the current credit price. This is in contrast with 
another landholder who was in the process of fina-
lising the ecological assessment of the land, but still 
had doubts regarding participation. This landholder 
was considered as ‘non-participant’ in the study.
10. The cost of the assessment would then be deducted 
from the credit sale from the landholder to the 
OEH.
11. Part A represents the management, that is, money 
the landholder will receive in perpetuity to improve 
the state of biodiversity on his/her land
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Appendix A. Interview guide
1. Characteristics of the landholder/institution and the 
land:
-Could you tell me about the organisational/business 
structure of [name of the institution/name of the 
operation]?
-Could you tell me about your role in [name of the 
institution]?
-Could you tell me what your age is?
-What is your educational background?
-What is your main occupation? Do you have 
a secondary occupation?
-What is the size of the property?
-Since when do you or your institution own the 
property?
-How much bushland is there on the property? How 
much is under biobanking (if relevant)?
-What are the main activities undertaken on the 
property?
-What are the activities undertaken on the property 
regarding bush management?
- What is your role on the property?
-Is there going to be a change in ownership in the near 
future? If so, why?
-Have you previously participated in a landownership 
program (for conservation)? If yes, which one(s)? What 
motivated you to participate in these programs? If no, 
why?
-If you had to distinguish between different ‘phases’ in 
the history of your property, what would they be?
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3. Other factors influencing decision-making regarding 
private land conservation
Do you think that private landholders have a role to play in 
protecting biodiversity in NSW? If so, how?
What types of activities on private lands do you think 
could negatively affect biodiversity?
What is the source of information you consult/trust around 
conservation/environmental management?
How would you think that your family members/peers 
would react if you were to participate in biobanking? 
How do you think that theses opinions could influence/ 
not influence your decision?
Do you think that the requirements of the scheme are 
achievable? If yes, why, and what would make you more 
confident? If not, why?
What would be the management requirements that you 
would consider suitable for your property?
Do you think that the activities required under the bio-
banking scheme are matching/contradicting your expec-
tations in terms of what the property should look like 
and what you want to achieve? If they are matching, 
could you tell me a bit more about how they match? If 
they are contradicting, could you tell me more about it? 
What types of activities would be more acceptable for 
you?
What are the supplier/channels of information you are 
more likely to consult and trust (e.g. advisor, ag peak 
body, neighbours, family members, government, etc.) 
regarding conservation?
What types of information do you receive through each 
channel?
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